Abstract
Introduction
More and more vulnerabilities threat Web Services confidentiality. Attacker usually invades system through vulnerability detection and simulating attack to get or change data illegally [1] . These greatly reduce the confidentiality of Web Services, and both service providers and customers' benefits are not protected effectively.
There are two kinds of confidential vulnerabilities: one is application vulnerabilities, which is same with what exists in Web application program, such as SQL injection, XPATH inject and XSS. These attacks can be found out by scanners, and this kind of vulnerabilities can be evaluated quantitatively according to attack difficulty, prevalence and harmfulness; another is exclusive vulnerabilities for Web Services, which mainly refer to whether confidential protection mechanisms have been used in the message level security, or what kind of security mechanism be deployed [2] . The effective method to analyze complex problem is analytic hierarchy. Here confidentiality is divided into three layers to dissect (Figure 1 ). The top level is: confidentiality (abbreviated as C); the middle level is: application vulnerability and exclusive vulnerability; the bottom level is: attack difficulty, prevalence, harmfulness and deployment of security mechanism. 
Quantify Indicators on Bottom Layer

Application Vulnerability
Refer to《Information security technology information safety risk assessment standard》in China, application vulnerabilities will be evaluated quantitatively based on attack difficulty, prevalence and harmfulness. The value of each indicator is from 1 point to 3 point, then security vectors will be described as ( C 11 , C 12 , C 13 ).
The quantization standard of the security vector is: Attack difficulty（C11） Quantitative criteria: If attack by software or other attack tools, C11 takes 1 point; If vulnerability needs analysis by human, attack needs commands and input parameters or simple programming, C 11 takes 2 point;
If vulnerability needs analysis by human, and attack is achieved through complex programming, C 11 takes 3 point; Prevalence (C12 ) Quantitative criteria: Based on the published rank of prevalence; Harmfulness (C13 ) Quantitative criteria: If attacker can obtain the highest authority, or control the entire service, C13 takes 1 point; If attacker can obtain query permission from system database, and hardly obtain modify permission, C 13 takes 2 point;
If attacker can only obtain query permission of service system database, or steal part of information in database, C 13 takes 3 point; According to the above standards, three kinds of popular vulnerabilities---SQL inject, XPATH inject and XSS, can be quantified through detailed analysis and necessary experiment.
(1) SQL injection SQL injection is a common attack for web system. Web Services usually receive parameters sent by client as string type. If the input strings are not checked strictly or insecure characters are not identified, the service will be attacked easily by SQL injection. There is a product and suppliers service system programmed by C# for example to do simulated attacks. This service contains two methods:
GetProductInfomationByName: browse the product details by inputting name; GetProductInfomationByID: browse product details by inputting ID number; The first step is to confirm whether the service has validation for input parameters. "GetProductInfomationByName" method needs customer input parameters, "name" and "password". The data type of "name" is probably string. Attacker input a character " ' ", while input the correct userid=001 and password=123456, then we can see that there is no check for the parameter "name" from the response of service. After "FaultString" analysis, attacker can find a syntax error that appears in SOL query sented into database----System DataOleDb OleDbException: syntax error in query expression "productname like ''' and providerid ='001' ", and then we discover SQL expression including "like" used in the program. Next, we input wildcards "%" in "name", it is really that the service return a XML message including product information.
The "GetProductInfomationByID" method needs customer input parameters, "uid" and "password". Using the same logic, we can bypass password validation through a SQL cheat when generating SQL query in service like this: Select something from some tables where userid='001' and password = ' or 1=1 or password = '. It is really that the service return a product information whose uid = 001 after we input " ' or 1=1 or password =' " in "password".
But the fact is that SQL injection is restricted by sql query which is not same in different databases and user's access permission. So attacker obtain certain data illegally just with the current user. Based on above analysis, we can get the following conclusion: Attack difficulty of SQL injection is in accordance with the second quantitative criteria of attack difficulty, C 11 takes 2 point; Harmfulness of SQL injection is in accordance with the second quantitative criteria of harmfulness, C 13 takes 2 point; According to the top 10 vulnerabilities in web security published in 2008, prevalence rank (from high to low) is: XSS, SQL injection, XPATH injection, so C 12 takes 2 point.
The security vector of SQL injection vulnerability is: S (SQL) = (2,2,2).
(2) XPATH injection The communication of Web Services is based on SOAP messages compiled by XML, so XPATH injection attack technique aiming at XML document, and which have become one of the main threaten to Web Services.
With loose inputting and fault-tolerant performances, XPATH injection can attach malicious XPATH query code to URL form or other information and then get access permission and change information illegally. Attacker can get a whole XML document's information through XPATH query, without any related details about XAPTH query prior. Through this way, attacker can control XML database operated by XPATH query to pass identity verification, search information or do other operations.
XPATH injection usually disguise to be special inputs or parameters passed to application program, and the special inputs are often some parts of XPATH queries. Through this way, attacker can do whatever he wants in XML database.
We take an identity verification service as an example to analyze XPATH injection in the following part.
In identity verification service there are two parameters: username and password. And the validating data stores in a XML document called user.xml. The principle is looking for username and password in the document called user.xml to get access privilege. In the next step, attacker inputs " ' or 1=1 or = ' " for both username and password, then the XPATH query sentence above becomes:
//users/user[loginID/text()=' or 1=1 or = ' and password/text()= ' or 1=1 or =' ] System will always return "true" in logic and permit attacker access databases. Attacker can operate XML document dynamically, so the important information in document even the highest authority can be gotten as attacker's wish. We can see that XPATH injection not only make the highest authority to be stolen, but also lets attacker operate XML document dynamically. These can exposes all the confidential information without any confidentiality guarantee. So we can draw the conclusion: Attack difficulty of XPATH injection is in accordance with the second quantitative criteria of attack The security vector of SQL injection vulnerability is: S (XPATH) = (2, 3, 1). (3)XSS (Cross-Site Scripting) XSS becomes more and more popular in Web Services recently. Attacker can insert malicious codes into web link visited by customers or XML document to access web site illegally, on purpose of stealing customers' information. The XSS attack involves three roles: attacker, sufferer and entity (web site or XML document) with malicious XSS code. Only the sufferer will actually execute the attacker's malicious code.
XSS vulnerability always deceives as a legitimate site, which is usually called "phishing attack". For example, the attacker simulates bank and sends an Email to customer, announcing customer's account will be necessary to be modified by bank. Then the customer was tempted to click the link:
http://mybank.com/somepageredirect=<script>alert('XSS')</script> Here hacker executes attack using "redirect" method. The customer executes the malicious code when he opens the URL link, then attacker will steal the customer's certificate or other information to enter his bank account illegally.
Beside above ways, malicious codes are always inserted into CDATA tag in XML. This is the common attack method happened in web services, just because the content in CDATA tag can not be parsed in firewall protection system .. The following part is an example to encapsulate XSS attack code in XML document :
<TAG1> <! [CDATA [<]]>SCRIPT<! [CDATA [>]]> alter ('xss'); <! [CDATA [<]]>/SCRIPT<! [CDATA [>]]> </TAG1> <TAG2> <! [CDATA ['or 1=1 or '' = ']]> </TAG2>
Using XSS vulnerability, attacker steals customer's information and data. Even they can manipulate the XML documents to control the entire service through inserting malicious code. With the same harmfulness to XPATH, XSS attack needs to write malicious scripting language and sometimes get the permission of controlling XML documents as the premise. Normally, the main script language for XSS attack is JAVA, so its attack difficulty is harder than other two. We can draw the conclusion: Attack difficulty of XSS is in accordance with the third quantitative criteria of attack difficulty, C 11 takes 3 point; Harmfulness of XSS is in accordance with the first quantitative criteria of harmfulness, C 13 takes 1 point; According to the top 10 vulnerabilities in web security published in 2008, C 12 takes 1 point.
The security vector of XSS vulnerability is: S (XSS) = (3,1,1).
Exclusive Vulnerability
Except application vulnerability, exclusive vulnerability seriously threatens the security of Web Services. This kind of vulnerability can not be scanned by tools, and which can only be quantified by analyzing security mechanism deployed on Web Services. Referring to 《 Information security technology information safety risk assessment standard》in China, the quantitative evaluation can be done on the basis with what kind of security mechanism deployed on service, and how it satisfies the confidential requirement. In order to achieve the confidentiality of Web Services, there are specific security mechanisms deployed on transmission level or message level. Security mechanisms deployed on transmission level mainly contains SSL, TLS, HTTPS, IPSec, VPN, etc, which can satisfy the confidential requirement of point-to-point communication, but barely ensure the security of end-to-end communication across middleware. In recent years, more and more Web Services adopt security mechanism based on WS-Security on message level to protect the confidentiality of end-to-end communication. WS-Security criterion, which gives a detailed description about how to attach security token to soap and how to combine with XML signature and XML encryption, is mainly used to protect SOAP message. WS-Security criterion provides an extensible framework for embedding security information in including digital signature, message digest and data encryption in SOAP. These security information, as additional controlling information, transmit in form of message, independent of any transport protocols [3] . In WS-Security criterion, XML signature is used to guarantee the confidentiality of SOAP.
According to the situation of security mechanism deployment, the bottom layer indicator C 21 is quantified like this:
There is not any security mechanism deployed, C 21 takes 1 point; Only security mechanism on transmission level is deployed, C 21 takes 2 point; Relevant mechanism in WS-Security criterion, such as XML Encryption, etc, is deployed, C 21 takes 3 point.
This quantization standard can be adjusted dynamically if new security mechanism is published.
Quantify Indicators on Middle Layer
Indicators on middle layer are constituted by the one on bottom layer, but the weights of the indicators on bottom layer are different. Here AHP method is used to evaluate the weights of indicators on bottom layer and middle layer.
Taking the bottom layer indicators C 11 , C 12 , C 13 for example, the calculation procedure of AHP method is like these [4] :  First, structure paired comparison elements for C11, C12, C13. Taking comparison between C11 and C12 as an example, each element is evaluated by nine grade scores: evaluating C11/C12 according to the importance between C11, C12, and the value of C11/C12 is an integer from 1 to 9, or is reciprocal. C11/C12=1 means the importance of C11 is the same with C12; C11/C12=9, or C12/C11=1/9, that means C11 is extremely important than C12. In a similar way, the other ratio is evaluated like this.  Second, a paired comparison judgment matrix is structured to be constituted by the above elements.  Third, the weights of C11, C12, C13 are solved by solving characteristic root of judgment matrix.  Forth, consistency check is executed to ensure the distribution of the weights fit the confidence, and if the result does not fit the confidence, the sample will be adjusted to reevaluate. In the following, the weights of C 11 , C 12 , and C 13 are evaluated using the above calculation procedure:
First of all, we structure the paired comparison judgment matrix:
Then the maximum characteristic root of matrix P is solved:  max = 9/89
The corresponding eigenvector is (24.3, 1, 87.4), after normalization, weight vector is finally gotten: W 3 =( W C11 , W C12 , W C13 )=（0.325,0.015,0.660）, that means the weights of attack difficulty, prevalence, harmfulness are 0.325、0.015、0.660 respectively.
The weight of C 21 takes 1, because it is the only one son indicator of C 2 .
In a similar way, the weight vector of indicators on middle layer is W 2 = （W C1 , W C2 ） = （0.45， 0.55） , that means the weights of application vulnerability and exclusive vulnerability are 0.45、0.55 respectively.
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Confidentiality Value calculation and Confidentiality Rating Classification
According to the vulnerabilities quantification and weights quantification above, the confidentiality value of application vulnerability and the confidentiality value of exclusive vulnerability are gotten. After weighted summation, the final confidentiality value is achieved. Then the confidentiality rank can be determined by membership function. The specific formulas are in the following, S（ A） , which stands for the confidentiality value of application vulnerability, S（ E ）means the confidentiality value of exclusive vulnerability, and S stands for the final confidentiality value [5] : S（ A ）= min{ R * W 3 S is taken as an independent variable and substituted in the above membership function. Then the respective degree of membership is gotten. The rank, which the maximal degree of membership belongs to, is the final confidentiality level of the evaluated Web Services.
Conclusions
This paper uses AHP method to dissect and analyze the indicators with fuzzy relationship structure. In order to describe the confidentiality of Web Services, we put forward a set of evaluation method aiming at different web services attack method. This algorithm solves the bottleneck problem of Web Services QOS preferably, and it can be expanded to the other subproblems of QOS quantification research.
